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Fischer  and  Gelb define  the main  components  of system  reform
programs aimed at transforming  a socialist economy into a
private  market  economy  and sketch  an illustrative  schedule  for
such a program for a representative  country.  The important
strategic choices, they say, arise from the interplay between
economics  and politics.
ThePolicy.Researc  andEncraalAffais  Conplex disutibutes  PRE Working hppe  todisseminatothefindings  of wo*k  in pwgress  nd
to encourage the excchnge of ideus among Bank stff  nd all edtm  interested in devdeopment  issues. These papers cary the names of
the authors, reflect only their views, and should be wed  nd cied  accordingly. The findings, interpretatins,  and concusions  are the
















































































































dPolicy,  Resrch,  and Extli  Affalr
Sod llat Econombs  Reform
WPS  565
This  paper-a  product  of  the  Socialist  Economies  Reform  Unit,  Country  Economics  Department-is part
ofalargereffortinPRE to provide  a framework  forthe  reform  of  socialisteconomies  and  review  experience
in a comparative  manner.  Copies  are  available  free  from  the World  Bank, 1818  H Street  NW, Washington
DC 20433. Please  contact  CECSE,  room N6-037,  extension  37188 (45 pages).
Fischer and Gelb examine  issues  involving  the  must begin  immediately,  but the ability  of the
design and sequence  of economic  reform  in  financial  system to allocate  resources  efficiently
formerly  socialist  economies  that have made  the  will remain  limited  until enterprise  and price
political  decision  to move  to a private  market  reform  are sufficiently  advanced.
economy. They also examine  the potential  role
of foreign  countries  in providing  aid, technical  In systemwide  reform,  the notion  of se-
assistance,  and market  access.  quencing  should  be replaced  by that of packag-
ing. A large number  of interrelated  reforms  -
In economies  that are actually  or potentially  including  those  needed  to create  an appropriate
unstable  macroeconomically,  the first priority  is  legal structure  and develop  the skills  needed  in a
macroeconomic  stabilization  and measures  to  market  economy  - has to be put in place very
harden  budget  constraints  and create an emer-  early,  although  the speed  of implementation  will
gency  social  safety  net.  differ.
At the center  of the reform  process  are pdrice  However  rapidly  the reforms  are initiated,
reform,  trade  liberalization,  enterprise  restructur-  their  completion  - especially  prvatization - is
ing, and privatization.  Banking  reform,  training,  bound  to take many years.
and the development  of other  financial  markets
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References  40ISSUES  IN SOCIALIST  ECONOMY  REFORM
Stanley  Fischer  and  Alan Gelb'
I. Introduction
The formidable  challenges  facing  the  reforming  European  Socialist
Economies  (ESEs)  are  frequently  said  to be unique. In fact,  most of the
individual  requirements  for  socialist  economy  reform  have  been  faced  before,
in China,  and  in Latin  American  and  African  countries  where  the  combination  of
a  weak  private  sector,  political  monopoly,  heavy  policy-induced  distortions
and  macroeconomic  imbalance  is  not  uncomon.  There  are  also  lessons  to  be
drawn  from  the  earlier  reform  experiences  ih  Yugoslavia  and  Hungary.
Nonetheless  the  challenge  is  unique,  in its  system-wide  scope,  in its
political  and  historical  context,  and  in the  speed  of desired  reform.
Few  socialist  countries  remain  unreformed  planned  economies. In the
last decade several --  for example China --  have instituted some economic
reforms,  while  trying  to preserve  the  state's  monopolies  on political  power,
the savings-investment  process,  and  social  ownership. However,  countries  such
as Hungary,  Poland,  Czechoslovakia,  and  Bulgaria  --  and  increasingly,  the
Soviet  Union  --  seek  fundamental  change  leading  to a pluralist  political
1/  Fischer  is  Professor  of  Economics  at  MIT, and  a  Research  Associate  of the
National  Bureau  of Economic  Research;  Gelb is Chief of the Socialist
Economies  Unit of the  World Bank.  Work on this paper  was begun  when
Fischer  was Chief  Economist  at the  World Bank.  Opinions  expressed  are
those  of the  .uthors,  and  are  not  official  views  of the  World  Bank. The
authors  are  indebted  to  Bela  Balassa,  Olivier  Blanchard,  Rudiger  Dornbusch,
and  Imre  Tarafas  for  helpful  comments.2
system,  well-defined  and  substantially  private  property  rights,  and
market-based  allocation  processes. Yugoslavia  should  by most criteria  be
included  here,  but in light  of its  long  history  of reform  and  political
independence,  and  non-membership  in  the  CMEA (Council  for  Mutual  Economic
Assistance), regards itself  as --  and is  --  sui aenerib.
In this  paper  we consider  the  reform  process  in countries  that  have  made
the  decision  to  move from  a  more  or a less-planned  socialist  system  to a
private  market  economy,  one  in  which  private  ownership  predominates  and  most
resources  are  allocated  through  markets. Such  reform  demands  the  creation  of
management  skills,  and  legal,  regulatory  and infrastructural  conditions,  whose
development  has been  set  back  by decades  of socialist  development. It also
requires  fundamental  changes  in  the  role  and  the  capabilities  of the  state.
We do  not treat  the  close  interrelationship  between  economic  and
political  reform  at any  length  in this  paper. 2 However,  we note that  the
important  strategic  choices  in  the  reform  process  arise  out  of the  interplay
between  economics  and  politics:  technocratic  solutions  alone  will not  be
sufficient  in deciding  on the  path  and  speed  of the  reform  process. Because
the reform  process  is  both intertwined  with  political  factors  and  economically
complicated,  and  because  there  are  substantial  differences  among  the  reforming
countries,  no single  detailed  road  map can  guide  the  way to the  new systems.
Therefore  the  paper  sets  out  general  considerations  that  provide  a framework
2/  Political  reform  prior  to economic  reform  may be needed  to prevent  the
latter  from  being  stalled  by an  entrenched  bureaucracy. But,  reflecting
the  complex  political-economic  interactions,  successful,  partial,  economic
reform  can provide  space for political  reform.  Providing  alternative
private  career  paths  for  the  nomenklatura  (a  contentious  issue  in  several
countries),  could  also  ease  certain  aspects  of  political  reform.3
for  reform,  2nd  relates  the  choices  to somie  initial  conditions  of the  various
reforming  countries. In the  metaphor  of  Vaclav  Klaus  (1990),  the  Finance
Minister  of  Czechoslovakia,  undertaking  reform  is like  playing  chess:  one
needs  to  know the  rules  and  have  a sense  of strategy,  but it is  not  possible
to  plan each  specific  move  at the  beginning.
Interdependence  between  reforming  socialist  countries  is also  very
important,  but  the  problems  posed  by the  January  1991  reform  of the  trade  and
payments  institutions  of the  CMEA  will not  be addressed  at length. 3
II.  Initial  Conditions  for  Reform
Recent  data  on the  economies  of  ESEs and  the  USSR  are  presented  in Table
1.  Estimates  of GNP,  aggregate  or  per capita,  vary  widely,  depending  on the
source  and  the conversion  method,  and  none can  be regarded  as accurate. 4 The
1988  CIA estimates  are  well above  rates  calculated  through  the  exchange  rate;
the  latter  are  more relevant  to the  borrowi..g  status  of actual  and  potential
members  of the  World  Bank.'
In any  case,  income  levels  in the  ESEs  appear  to  be above  the  averagi  of
3/  The  CMEA  is an essentially  bilateral  system  of trade  relations,  with the
Soviet  Union  being the dominant  trading  partner  of each of the smaller
East  European  countries.  Yugoslavia  is  not  a  member  of  the  CMEA. Payments
among  CHEA  countries  are  expected  to  be  made in  hard  currencies,  at  world
prices,  from  the  beginning  of 1991.
A/  The estimates  shown in the row "CMGr  Physical  Indicators"  are close to
purchasing  power  estimates  of real incomes. See Fink  and  Havlik (1989)
for  discussion  of alternative  inc.-e  estimates.
5/  The  exchange  rate  based  estimates  --  which  use  actual  exchange  rates  for
countries  such  as  Poland  and  Yugoslavia  that  have  reformed  their  exchange
arrangements,  and  staff  estimates  for  other  countries  --  imply  that all
ESEs  would  be  eligible  World  Bank  (IBRD)  borrower.  by  the  income  criterion.4
Latin  America,  bu!  well below  those  of  Western  Europe. Until  recently,  East
Germany  was thought  to be the  most advanced  of the  ESE  countries,  with the  CIA
suggesting  in 1989  that  per  capita  income  was  over  60 percent  of the  United
States  level. A closer  look  at East  Germany  has  persuaded  many that
Czechoslovakia  has the  highest  per  capita  income,  with  Hungary  the  next,  but
this  view could  change  with closer  examination  -if  the  other  countries. Poland
and  Hungary  are  heavily  indebted  in  convertible  currency,  and  Yugoslavia  has
borrowed  intensively.
As  measured  by their  reported  Gini  coefficients  of around  24 (the  same
as Norway  and  a little  higher  than  Sweden),  income  is relatively  equally
distributed  in  the  ESE  countries;  Gini coefficients  in the  range  30-35  are
common  for  industrial  market  economies.'  By international  standards,  social
indicators  such  as longevity  and  literacy  are  high  for  the  income  levels  of
these  economies,  though  there  has  been a relative  decline  in  their  social
indicators  during  the  past  decade  and  some  evidence  of recent  retrogression.
The  ESEs  experienced  similar  growth  patterns  after  the immediate  post
World  War II  period. Growth  at the  extensive  margin,  based  largely  on the
accumulation  of capital  through  very high  investment  rates,  and increasing
labor  force  participation,  was quite  rapid  until  the  seventies,  although  there
was probably  less  technical  progress  than  in  Western  Europe. In the  late
seventies  growth  gave  way to stagnation,  worsening  shortages,  and, in some
countries,  worsening  macro-imbalances.  By contrast  with Western  Europe,  there
6/  Inter-regional  income differences  account for much  of the  observed
inequality in  socialist countries, essentially  because of  limited
equilibrating  factor  market  resource  flows.  This  is  why  Yugoslavia's  Gini
coefficient  is relatively  high;  for discussion  of this effect  in rural
China  see  Byrd  and  Gelb (1990)5
was no recovery  in  tbe  first  half  of the 1)80s.*
Despite  the  broad  similarities  in the  structures  of the  ESE economies,
important  differences  in initial  conditions  will shape  their  reform
processes:
1)  The  extent  of  macroeconomic  imbalance,  both  internal  and  external;
2) The  degree  of decentralization  of  economic  manazement  and  extent
of  product  markets  prevailing  before  system  reform  begins;  and
3)  The extent  of  private  sector  activity  prior  to  reform.
Figure  1  depicts  the  first  two  initial  conditions  --  macro  imbalances,  anc
management  decentralization  --  of seven  countries.B
Macro-imbalances.  Domestic  macro-imbalance  in  a socialist  economy  can
take  various  forms,  from  open  inflation  to the  involuntary  accumulation  of
financial  claims  because  of the  rationing  of acceptable  goods  and/or  the
absence  of alternative  assets  (the  monetary  overhang). Poland  probably
embarked  on reform  from  the  worst  macro  position,  with  an overwh  tng  debt
problem  and  high  inflation. Yugoslavia  was in  better  shape  on the  external
side  but  also  suffered  from  verv  high inflation  and  enormous  domestic  lcsses
in the  banking  system  which  threatened  macroeconomic  stability. The  USSR  and
7/  Like  estimstes  of  real  income,  the  growth  rates  of  the  socialist  economies
are  the subject  of debate. In some  cases,  including  East  Germany,  high
reported  growth  rates  are  known  to  have  resulted  from  statistical
manipulation.  Nevertheless,  the  general  picture  in  European  socialist
countries  is  of  quite  high  growth  rates  declining  sharply  from  the  latter
half of the seventies  and stagnation  through  a period of attempts  at
reform.  This is very different  to China,  which stagnated  prior  to the
reforms  initiated  in the 1970s,  and grew rapidly  thereafter  (Chen  and
Singh  1990).
8/  The relative  positions  of countries  in Figure  1 necessarily  reflect  a
degree  of judgment. Some  countries  included  in  Table l  are  omitted  from
Figure  1 for  lack  of information.6
Bulgaria  face  major  macro-imbalances.  Internal  disequilibrium  appears  to  be
relatively  larger  in the  former  but  the  burden  of foreign  debt  is  much lower,
especially  if account  is taken  of substantial  gold  reserves.'  Hungary  has the
largest  external  debt  per capita  and  persistent  inflation  of about  20 percent,
but  a relatively  small  budget  deficit. With low  foreign  debt  and  probably
only  moderata  domestic  imbalances,  Czechoslovakia  appears  to be in the  best
macro  situation. East  Germany  is,  of course,  a special  case  because  it  has
been  reformed  out  of existence,  in a  process  involving  the  underwriting  of
foreign  debts  and  any  monetary  overhang  by the  Federal  Republic.
The  extent  and  type  of  macro  imbalance  prevailing  before  reform  has  an
important  bearing  on the  potential  speed  and  design  of structural  reform
programs. Although  it  can  be one  of the  ways to eliminate  a monetary
overhang,  the inflation  that  will accompany  liberalization  from  a position  of
repressed  excess  demand  is  likely  to cause  serious  economic  and  political
difficulties  for  reform. Although  the  elimination  of the  monetary  overhang
should  in  principle  be possible  with a one-time  change  in  the  price  level,
rising  prices  may  even  accentuate  the  flow  disequilibrium  by  worsening  the
9/  In March 1990 the USSR published  a list of its debtors  and identified
overall  international  assets  of $145  billion,  of whic, $74 billion  was
owed by CMEA members  and $  71 billion  by developing  countries:  Ox_ord
Analytica.  7126/90.  It is not clear to what extent these debts are
collectible,  but  on paper at least the USSR has  thus developed a
substantial  net international  credit  position,  which could  give it some
leeway  in adjusting  its external  accounts. Bulgaria  has also extended
credit  to  developing  countries,  notably  in  the  Middle  Eart. Reform  of  the
CMEA  system  will probably  be to  the  advantage  of  the  USSR  but  adverse  for
Bulgaria.7
fiscal  balance' 0 --  thus  potentially  turning  what should  be a one-time  change
in the  price  level  into  a  more persistent  increase  in the  inflation  rate.
High open  inflation  has to  be eliminated  for  structural  reforms  to be
effective. Eliminating  excess  demand  is also  important  for  mi-roeconomic
reasons:  studies  of firms  in socialist  countries  suggest  that  the  shift  from
sellers'  markets  to  buyers'  markets  is essential  in  modifying  firms'
efficiency  and  customer  orientation.
Countries  close  to  macroeconomic  equilibrium  have  greater  latitude  to
implement  those  institutional  reforms  most needed  to support  the  operation  of
markets  before  switching  over  to  market  mechanisms." Those  needing  urgent
stabilization  face  difficult  decisions  of sequencing  stabilization  measures
(which  in  the  past  have  typically  involved  the  tightening  of controls)  and
structural  reforms  lee.ding  to a  market  system.
Markets  and  Decentralization  Turning  to the  other  axis  of  Figure  1,  at
the  start  of 1990,  Czechoslovakia,  East  Germany,  the  Sovist  Union,  and
Bulgaria  had  relatively  centralized  economies,  with a  planned  materials  supply
system  playing  a  major  role  and  with  enterprise  management  subject  to the
constant  interventio..  of  ministries." 2 By contrast,  Yugoslavia  has  long  been
10/  This  could  happen  as a  result  not  only  of  the  Tanzi  effect,  in  which  real
tax  revenues  decline  as inflation  rises,  but  also because  partial  price
decontrol  may require  increasing  government  subsidies  to maintain  the
prices  of necessities  constant.
11/  For  examples  of  authors  who  advocate  such  a  pattern,  where  the  institutions
needed to support  markets are put in place prior to each stage of
liberalization,  see  Svejnar  (1990)  and  the  so-called  sequential  approach
outlined  in Rosefielde  (1990).
12/  For  descriptions  of  the  USSR  and  Chinese  patterns  of  management,  see  Hewitt
(1988)  and  Lin  and  Tidrick  (1989).8
the  most decentralized  of the  socialist  countries,  with Hungary  (since  1968)
and  Poland  progressively  moving  the  distribution  of  products  onto  a  market
basis  - although with distorted prices --  and according greater  autonomy to
firms  * s
With only  limited  private  ownership  permitted,  decentralization  has
resulted  in  self-management  of the  social  or state  capital  within  firms. In
addition  to the  dominant  role  of the  self-managed  sector  in  Yugoslavia,  some
70  percent  of Hungarian  and  Polish  firms  are  at present  self-managed.
"Socialism  without  planning"  has  distinctive  characteristics  which  have  been
extensively  analyzed. These  include  a lack  of effective  balance-sheet
constraints  on firms,  because  of i) the  "absence"  of effective  owners  and  ii)
extensive  fiscal  redistribution  between  enterprises,  largely  motivated  by a
commitment  to full  employment  effected  through  preserving  existing  jobs.  This
adversely  affects  incentives,  and  results  in chronic  scarcity,  impelled  by a
combination  of expansionist  management  unconstrained  by considerations  of
profitability,  and  workers  seeking  higher  pay  without  fear  of layoffs  and
unemployment. 14  Incomes  are  divorced  from  productivity  by subsidies." 5
13/  China is  a  distinctive  case.  It  adopted a  two-tier approach to
decentralization  and  markets,  with  state  firms  and  a  material  supply  aystem
coexisting  with  a  growing  nonstate  sector  (largely  in  agriculture  and  rural
industry),  trading  increasingly  on  a  market  basis  b';-  with  different  prices
for  similar commodities.  China also has  exper.nented  with  regional
differentiation  in its reform  process,  with some  provinces  and special
zones  moving  far  more rapidly  towards  markets  and pluralistic  forms  of
ownership.  See Byrd and Lin  (1990).  Regional  decentralization  has
progressed  far  in  China. (Many  of  the  prerogatives  which  firms  have  gained
in ESEs  have  been captured  by lower  levels  of goverment in  China.)
14/  Authors  differ  in the emphasis  they  place  on the  relative  importance  of
the absence of a well-defined  bottom line for management,  and  the
responsibility  of management  to the workers, in accounting  for the
performance  of decentralized  firms  in ESEs.  (See for examples,  KornaiRelative  prices  are  also  divorced  from  world  patterns,  with energy,
transportation,  and  state  rents  normally  far  below  world  levels,  credit  c}-.ap
and  subsidies  on staple  foods. Taxes  and subsidies  insulate  domestic  prices
of traded  commodities  from  their  world levels.
One  symptom  of the  distorted  initial  position  from  which  market  reforms
are  beginning  in  ESEs  is the  problem  that  a  market  socialist  banking  system,
though  superficially  transformed  from  the  monobank  of the  centralized  system,
has  no basis  for  allocating  credit  according  to  market  criteria,  and  for
identifying  and  pricing  risk.  Credit  allocation  in  such  a  situation  is
indeterminate,  being  set  neither  by plan  nor  by  market. Avoiding  severe
macroeconomic  imbalances  in such  a system  is  extremely  difficult,  essentially
because  economic  agents  have  autonomy  without  responsibility.
Decentralization  may refle!t  a  deliberate  policy  decision  to relax
central  planning,  attempting  to gain  advantages  from  market  organization
without  confronting  the ideologically  difficult  issue  of ownership  and  the
technically  difficult  issues  of transformation  into  a private  market  economy.
Or, it  may result  from  a power  vacuum  following  a decline  in the  legitimacy  of
government,  or a change  of government.' 6 In many  respects,  a decentralized
(1990a)  and  Hinds  (1990)).
15/  China's  rural  economy  can  be said  to consist  of product  markets  without
factor  markets, as individuals  cannot move easily and interregional
resource  flows  are constrained. However,  communities  face quite  hard
budget  constraints  and  fiscal  mechanisms  to equalize  incomes  across  them
are limited,  so that, on a group basis at least,  incomes  reflect  the
availability  and  productivity  of local  factors.
16/  Czechoslovakia  saw  moves in this direction,  with workers  in some firms
effectively  dismissing  their  managers  through  votes  of  no  confidence,  but
has taken  steps  to reassert  centralized  control  as a preliminary  to the
move to a private  market  economy.10
socialist  economy  starts  off  the  transition  to a  private  market  economy  with
advantages  over  its  more  planned  counterpart.  Agents  are  more familiar  with
markets,  and  their  response  to  market  incentives  is therefore  likely  to be
faster. Also,  as indicated  in  Table  1,  a larger  share  of the  exports  of the
less  centralized  countries  goes  to  couatries  outside  the  CMEA  area  and  is thus
subject  Lo  global  competition.  Firms  in these  countries  are  more likely  to
have  had  commercial  dealings  with foreign  firms  than  firms  in centrally
planned  systems,  and  are  more likely  to  have  had  some  exposure  to the  real
needs  of clients. Especially  in light  of  the  depressed  conditions  of CMEA
members,  the  ability  to increase  exports  rapidly  to  Western  markets  must be an
important  determinant  of the  speed  with  which  reform  can  show  results.
On the  negative  side,  reformers  of a decentralized  economy  must address
the  problem  of rendering  powerful  and  previously  relatively  independent  firms
accountable,  whether  to the  market  (by  reducing  cross-subsidies  and/or
offering  them  the  opportunity  to  privatize  themselves)  or directly  (by
asserting  the state's  ownership  rights  and  recentralizing  decisionmaking
power).  Removing  acquired  rights  is  not  easy,  especially  as a shift  towards
representative  democracy  requires  maintaining  a reasonable  degree  of
consensus.
Together  with  measures  to limit  serious  abuses  in the  course  of
spontaneous  privatizations,' 7 a blend  of carrot  and  stick  is in  practice
evolving  in  reforming  countries  to deal  with decentralized  firms  that  are  not
17/  Spontaneous  privatization  is a process  initiated  by the  management  of a
firm  whereby  the firm is sold,  or its assets  are leased,  to a private
corporation  in  which  the  managers  and  possibly  workers  have an interest.
Spontaneous  privatization  emerged  in Hungary  and Poland,  and somewhat
later  in  Yugoslavia;  it is also  taking  place  in the  Soviet  Union.11
yet  privatized. Carrots,  such  as the  prospect  of  exemption  from  wage curbs
applied  to socially-owned  firms  and  cheap  shares  for  employees,  appeal  to
those  in  potentially  profitable  firms. Sticks,  such  as  bankrupting  the  firm
and  dissolving  its  worker  council  if  debts,  dividends,  or an annual  fee  for
state  capital  are  not  paid,  threaten  the  lossmaking  ones."
Assuming  that  opposition  from  its  ministries  has  been  overcome,  a
reforming  centralized  economy  can  consider  al.d  implement  a  wider  range  of
options  for  addressing  ownership  and  management  issues. 19  Despite  this
advantage,  it is  unlikely  that  such  economies  face  an easier  transition. On
the  contrary,  their  greater  distance  from  a  market  configuration  probably
implies  more difficulty  in reshaping  institutions  and  acquiring  necessary
skills.
One important  question  for  a still-centralized  economy  is  whether  to
pass  through  the  stage  of  market  socialism  prior  to reforming  to a private
market  economy. Because  this  would  first  involve  giving  ownership  rights  to
workers,  and  then  reclaiming  those  rights,  this  is  a  most  undesirable  reform
path.  Accordingly,  an economy  starting  out  from  a centralized  system  should
make great  efforts  to  prevent  ownership  rights  from  being  assumed  by firms'
managers  and  workers  in  an early  phase  of reform,  by defining  ownership  rights
clearly  ar.d  assigning  them  as rapidly  as  possible  to  agents  or institutions
18/  Poland  and Yugoslavia  have adopted  variants  of this carrot  and stick
approach.  In the former,  failure  to pay a dividend  to the government
triggers  intervention;  in  the  latter,  late  payment  on  debts  is  the  trigger.
19/  Czechoslovakia  is a case in point,  with the  famous  voucher  scheme  being
only  one  of  many proposals  under  consideration.  See  Klaus (1990).12
outside  the  enterprises. 20
The  Pre-Reform  Scone  of the  Private  Sector. Most of the  ESEs  have  for
some  time  codified  certain  private  property  rights,  but their  private  sectors
are  relatively  small  (almost  zero  in  Czechoslovakia)  and  are  largely  in crafts
and  distributive  trades. 21 In some  cases  agriculture  is substantially  private
(75  percent  in  Poland,  whereas  agricultural  production  in  Bulgaria  is
dominated  by a few  public  conglomerates). 22 In certain  other  socialist
countries  the  private  sector  is far  larger  than  in  ESE; for  example,  it
accounts  for  about  one-half  of the  economic  activity  in  Vietnam. Because  it
will be easier  to relax  restrictions  on an  existing  private  sector  than  to
attempt  to create  a  private  sector  from  scratch,  countries  with substantial
private  sector  activity  and  a private  asset  base  start  the  reform  process  with
a  notable  advantage. The  strategy  of first  empowering  the  private  sector  and
then  progressively  reforming  the  public  sector  and  relying  on the  private
sector  to absorb  laid-off  employees  is  more  viable  the  larger  is  the initial
private  sector.
III.  Elements  of Reform
The  move to a full  market  economy  requires  political  changes  that
20/  We do not argue  against  some  employee  shareholding  or representation  on
Boards,  as in codetermination.  However,  there  should  be an independent
locus  of control  on the  Board.
1,/  For  example,  limited  forms  of  private  property  were legally  protected  from
1955  in Hungary,  and  their  scope  progressively  enlarged,  notably  in 1968
and 1982. Private  property  in  China  and  the  USSR,  on the  other  hand,  has
lacked  a formal  legal  underpinning.
22/  For  reviews  of  the  private  sector  in  four  ESE  countries  see  Webster  (1990).13
recognize  the  value  of diversity  and  individual  initiative,  and  that  require  a
substantial  social  and  political  consensus. This  consensus  seems  to exist  in
Poland,  Hungary,  and  Czechoslovakia,  but  does  not  now  exist  in  Romania  or
probably  in the  Soviet  Union. System  reform  also  requires  fundamental  changes
in  the  role  and  organization  of government.  It requires  countless  changes  in
economic  structure  and  behavior,  whose  nature  can  be understood  by comparing
the  working  of the  ESEs  with those  of  more advanced  market  countries. The
discussion  of these  changes  that  follows  is  summarized  by Table  2,  which
classifies  the  needed  changes. Their  sequencing  is  discussed  in Section  IV
below.
Macroeconomic  stabilization  and  control: The question  of  whether
macroeconomic  stabilization  is indeed  possible  in  a socialist  system,  or
whether  it  requires  a reform  of property  rights,  involving  the  clear
definition  of ownership,  has  been  raised  by some  analysts,  notably  Hinds
(1990). Following  the  recent  experiences  of  Poland  and  Yugoslavia  (as  well as
considering  the  measures  used  to stabilize  market  countries  with large  public
sectors),  it is reasonable  to assert  that  tightening  of fiscal  and  credit
policy  reduces  inflation  and  the  current  account  deficit  in socialist  as  well
as in  market  economies.
However,  there  are some  differences,  which  reflect  the  different
microeconomic  incentive  structures  between  the  two  systems. As socialist
firms  know  no bottom  line,  stabilization  policies  cannot  rely  on the  same
responses  as those  in  a market  economy. For  example,  rising  interest  rates
may indeed  encourage  households  to accumulate  financial  assets,  but  firms  may
simply  refinance  growing  interest  charges,  in  a giant  Ponzi  scheme  that14
initially  delays  reform  and  then  renders  it  extremely  costly. A range  of
direct  controls  will therefore  be  needed  to  reinforce  indirect  measures.
These  can include:  the  elimination  of ex  post subsidies  to individual  firms
and the  setting  of strict  cash limits  on them,  direct  central  bank control
over  the  quantity  of credit,  and  public  sector  wage controls. Until
bankruptcy  becomes  a credible  threat,  credit  control  risks  being  undermined  by
a  proliferation  of interfirm  payment  arrears,  especially  because  socialist
firms  tend  to be closely  linked  in oligopolistic  interdependencies.2  In the
face  of an inefficient  banking  system,  inter-enterprise  credits  can  play  a
useful  role  in facilitating  adjustment  to  rapidly  changing  circumstances,  but
the  volume  and  distribution  must  be monitored,  just  as for  bank  credit."'  25
The  longer  run success  of  macroeconomic  tightening  depends  on the
political  resolve  and  the  economic  skill  of the  government,  which is  bound  to
come  under  severe  pressure  when firms  run  into  financial  trouble. A skilled
government  will already  be  working  out  criteria  and  methods  for  the
restructuring  of enterprises. It  will also  have  to institute  measures  --  the
social  safety  net --  to  protect  the  living  standards  of those  adversely
affected  by the economic  reforms. In  particular,  because  job loss  is likely
23/  Central  planning  is facilitated  by  minimizing  the number  of firms  to
reduce  the  complexity  of  control,  and  spontaneous  entry  and  exit  processes
are  virtually  absent  under  socialism.
24/  Yugoslavia  has instituted  a centralized  reporting  system  covering  both
bank and  interenterprise  credit,  and  late  payments  on either  can  trigger
intervention  and  bankruptcy.
25/  Both  the  phenomena  discussed  in  this  paragraph  have  their  counterparts  in
market  economies:  firms  facing  a high risk  of bankruptcy  may attempt  to
borrow  at very high interest  rates  --  a tendency  that leads  lenders  to
ration  credit  at  market  interest  rates;  and  inter-firm  credit,  sometimes
called  the  gray  market,  tends  to expand  when bank credit  is constrained.15
to prove  the  most traumatic  consequence  of reorganization  in economies  that
have  not  previously  known  open  unemployment,  it is  essential  to include  a
social  safety  net for  the  unemployed  in  planning  any stabilization-cum-reform
program. In the  beginning,  measures  will have  to be set  up on an emergency
basis,  because  the  ESEs  have  no administrative  structures  for  dealing  with
open  unemployment.  Over  the  longer  run,  a more  complete  social  safety  net
will have  to be developed. 2"
In addition  to  measures  to discipline  firms  and  address  unemployment,
fiscal  reform  must  have  a high  priority. With tax  revenues  highly  dependent
on profit  remittances  from  enterprises,  measures  to increase  their  financial
autonomy  and  at the  same  time  absorb  losses  due  to restructuring  are  likely  to
have  a serious  impact  on the  budget. Revenues  from  privatization  are  likely
to become  significant  only  in the  medium  term,  even if  privatization  itself  is
accelerated;  increased  revenues  from  privatization  and  greater  efficiency  are
likely  to lag  the increased  costs  associated  with restructuring.  Because  of
the  uncertain  size  of any  particular  tax  base in  the  turbulent  reform
environment,  there  are  arguments  for  raising  revenues  as broadly  as  possible,
subject  to the  problems  posed  by inadequate  accounting,  auditing  and
enforcement.
Since  governments  will in the  longer-term  have to  maintain  macroeconomic
control  through  the  indirect  levers  employed  in  modern  market  economies,
26/  The  far  lower  levels  of  productivity  in the  ESEs should  be borne  in  mind
when  assessing  the  applicability  of  West  European  social  insurance  systems
with  their  relatively  high  benefit  levels. Because  of  the  initially  quite
equal  income  distributions  in the  ESEs,  it  may be difficult  for  them  to
formulate  comprehensive  social  insurance  schemes  and at the same time
widen differentials  to create  adequate  incentives.16
fiscal  and  financial  sector  reforms  with a  broader  perspective  than  immediate
macroeconomic  balance  have  to be initiated. These  reforms  will be essential
to increase  the  efficiency  of the  economy,  and  to  complement  the  enterprise
restructuring  that  will result  in firms  responding  to  market  and interest  rate
signals. Such  responses  will not  be efficient  unless  prices  are  themselves
rational  --  and inieed,  as discussed  below,  it  may not  be possible  or
desirable  to impose  tight  budget  constraints  on firms  without  rational  prices.
This illustrates  the  complementarity  among  the  elements  of policy  and
structural  changes,  and  the  need  --  discussed  below  --  to undertake  certain
reforms  simultaneously.
Estimates  of the  extent  of the  monetary  overhang  vary;  it is difficult
to evaluate  in the  absence  of  most other  stores  of  value,  but  seems  to be
significant  in  the  USSR (estimates  place  it  at about  one-half  of financial
assets  held  by households)  and  may exist  in  some  of the  smaller  countries.
There  are  several  broad  options  for  eliminating  the  overhang  without  drawing
on foreign  exchange  reserves  or foreign  borrowing:  a currency  reform  which
freezes  or eliminates  financial  balances  above  certain  levels;27  inflation,
incompletely  compensated  by interest  rates;  raising  interest  rates  on existing
assets  or introducing  new  higher-return  assets;  and  the  sale  of state  assets
to the  public.
A confiscatory  fiscal  reform  is  problematic,  especially  in  the  context
of a reform  aiming  to secure  private  property  rights,  but  can  possibly  be
politically  justified  as the  result  of  the  mistakes  of the  previous
27/  See  Dornbusch  and  Wolf (1990)  on  the  effectiveness  of  currency  reforms  in
dealing  with  the  post-World  War  II  monetary  overhang  in  several  countries.17
governments  and  the  dubious  nature  of activities  which  had  allowed  individuals
to build  up private  wealth. The  inflationary  route  was in  effect  taken  in
Poland  and  Yugoslavia  at the  end  of 1989,  but is inadvisable  after  an
adjustment  process  has  been started,  and  imposes  high costs  of its  own.
Raising  interest  rates  on  existing  assets,  such  as saving  accounts,  will  help
reduce  the  inflationary  pressure  from  the  current  overhang  --  but  most
estimates  suggest  that  raising  interest  rates  to  normal  levels  would  not  be
sufficient  to eliminate  the  overhang  in the  USSR.
There  are  strong  arguments  for  the sale  of public  assets,  especially
since  this  approach  can  be made  consistent  with the  goal  of strengthening  the
small-scale  private  sector. Sale  of small  enterprises  and  premises  for
businesses  and  retail  shops  is one  example;  sale  of the  housing  stock  is
another,  though  this  would  need  accompanying  measures  to raise  the  cost  and
reduce  the security  of renting,  and  these,  in  turn,  would  require  adjustment
of pay levels  to reflect  higher  rents. Because  rents  are  usually  far  below
maintenance  costs,  even  giving  housing  away  would  improve  the  budget  on a flow
basis. It has  though  to  be recognized  that  privatization  is likely  to  be a
slow  process.  One possible strategy --  not yet used in the ESEs --  is to
combine  currency  reform  with the  sale  of  assets. Asset  holdings  above  a
certain  level  can  be frozen  and  their  subsequent  use  permitted  to  purchase
assets  that  are  being  privatized.
Consider  now  external  balance. Especially  once  measures  are taken  to
harden  budget  constraints  and  restrain  domestic  demand,  exchange  rate  changes
should  be effective  in  switching  expenditures  and  output  in socialist
economies,  provided  that  price  reform  creates  a link  between  world and18
domestic  prices  for  tradeables.  However,  again  the  distinctive  institutional
arrangements  of the  ESEs  constrain  the  likely  respcnse. Over  half of the
exports  of the  ESEs go to  countries  in  the  CMEA  system. Many of these
products  are  not of adequate  quality  and  appeal  to  be acceptable  on  world
markets. Within  the  unreformed  CMEA  system,  trade  flows  were arranged  through
inter-government  protocols  rather  than  being  responsive  to relative  prices.
Except  for  the  USSR (which  exports  hard  currency  commodities),  the
imminent  comprehensive  reform  of the  CMEA  system  towards  multilateral,  market-
based,  trading  (which  is a logical  complement  to internal  reforms)  raises  the
problem  that  each  reforming  country's  exports  must compete  in previously
sheltered  markets  with superior  products  from  the  West.  Reforms  in one
socialist  country  as  well as in the  trading  system  can  render  more difficult
the  short-run  task  of  maintaining  external  balance  in the  other  reforming
countries. Indeed,  exports  from  certain  small  ESEs to the  West could  actually
fall  because  of the  need to  divert  world-quality  products  to the  USSR to  pay
for  essential  imports  of fuels  and  raw  materials. In the  longer-run,  of
course,  reform  of the  CMEA system  will have  a  positive  effect  on the  economies
of its  members  --  and  certain  countries,  notably  Hungary,  have  already
demonstrated  their  ability  to increase  exports  to the  West quite  rapidly.
In sum,  stabilization  measures  involving  a combination  of controls  on
aggregates  and  specific  interventions  can  be effective. But,  given  their
economic  rigidities,  narrow  markets  and  small  convertible-currency  trade
ratios,  the  response  of socialist  systems  to expenditure  reducing  and
switching  measures  is  likely  to be less  rapid  and  more costly  in terms  of
output  than  is typical  in  market  economies. Further,  the  cost  is likely  to be19
raised  by simultaneous  reforms  in other  ESEs,  due  to the  disruption  and loss
of  protected  markets.
Institutional  and  comDlementarv  reforms. Institutions  and  professions  that
are  taken  for  granted  in  market  economies  have  to be re-created  in the
reforming  socialist  economies. Legal,  regulatory,  and  information  systems
need to  be reformed  to support  markets. 28  A secure  legal  environment  has to
be created  for  the  protection  of property  rights  and  the  regulation  of
commercial  relations. Accounting  and  audit  systems  are  needed  to organize  and
monitor  information.  Complementing  such  system  reforms  are  needed  investments
in  human  capital,  in  areas  such  as accounting,  credit  and  market  analysis,  and
bank inspection.  Management  skills  have  to  be upgraded  and  modernized,
especially  in the  areas  of finance  and  marketing. In some  areas,  such  as
financial  markets,  reform  may require  a greater  state  role  than  before.
When assessing  the  effo--ts  underway  to change  legal  and  regulatory
institutions  in reforming  soc_\list  countries  rapidly,  it  must be remembered
that  those  of the  market  economies  have  evolved  over  centuries. Such reforms
and  the  creation  of  human  capital  appropriate  to  a  new system,  are lengthy
processes  which  pose  a constraint  on  the  efficiency  and  speed  of reform. 29
They  also  constitute  an area  in  which  foreign  assistance  may be especially
useful  in the  transition.
28/  One  suggestion  is  that  a reforming  economy  take  over  and  adapt  a  complete
legal and regulatory  system  from a market economy  with historic  and
cultural  ties.  For example,  Hungary  and  Czechoslovakia  might adopt  and
adapt  the  Austrian  framework. East  Germany  has, of course,  cssentially
simply  adopted  the  institutions  of the  FRG.
29/  Consider  for  example  that  in the  United  States  it takes  a  minimum  of five
years to train an examiner  capable of dealing  with the smallest  and
simplest  bank.20
Price  and  market  reform. Given  the  mutual  interdependence  of  prices  and  their
sheer  number  (some  25  million  even  in the  planned  Soviet  economy),  the  process
of  moving  to a  more rational  set  of  prices  could  be highly  complex  and
extended. Fortunately,  the  rational  price  system  needed  for  increased
enterprise  autonomy  to  make sense  is  known:  it is  world  prices. The  best  way
to introduce  rational  prices  is to open  the  economy  to foreign  trade. An open
trade (and  current  payments)  policy  also  exposes  domestic  producers  to foreign
competition,  and  offers  the  prospect  of  more  rapid  increases  in  the  quality  of
products,  through  a range  of licensing,  processing,  marketing  and  other  joint
venture  arrangements  with foreign  firms. This  route  is certainly  available
for  the  ESEs,  which  will become  more open  as they  reform,  and  which  can  expect
considerable  growth  in trade  (especially  intra-i-dustry  trade)  with  market
economies.30
The  Polish  government's  move to current  account  convertibility  (at  a
heavily  depreciated  exchange  rate)  should  thus  be seen  not  only  as a  way of
improving  the  current  account,  but  more importantly  as an essential  and
immediate  move to a rational  price  system  that  helped  force  competition.  In
practice,  some  price  distorting  tariffs  will remain:  uniform  tariffs  can  be
justified  as a source  of fiscal  revenue,  but  it  would  be only  realistic  to
30/  Open  foreign  trade  provides  a rational  price  system  for  traded  goods,  but
of course  not for  non-traded  goods. And  until  the  capital  account  of the
balance  of payments  is opened,  interest  rates  and asset  prices  can also
diverge  from  world levels. For  a large,  closed,  economy  like  the  USSR,
it is less clear that a rapid  move to world prices  would be the most
appropriate  strategy. However,  even in the  case of the Soviet  Union,  a
rapid  liberalization  of  trade,  combined  with  gradually  declining  tariffs,
would  provide  potential  markets  for  exporters  and  an  important  element  of
potential  import  competition  for domestic  monopolists,  thereby  helping
create  the  appropriate  relative  price  structure.21
recognize  that  the  reforming  ESE governments  are  no  more likely  to  move
immediately  to undistorted  trade  than  are  other  governments. Nonetheless,
world  relative  prices  are  the  ri8ht  reference  point.
Trade  and  domestic  reforms  are  mutually  dependent. Domestic
deregulation,  in agriculture,  industry,  and survices,  and  enterprise  reform
has  to take  place  if firms  are  to respond  appropriately  to price  signals.
Some  analysts  (Nuti  1990)  seem  to argue  for  liberalizing  internal  markets  and
reforming  administered  prices  before  liberalizing  international  trade. But
such  reforms  are  more likely  to succeed  if an appropriate  price  system  is
already  in  place  --  and liberalized  trade  can  be an important  element  in
producing  such  a price  system.
Price  liberalization  is  also  necessary  for  the  credible  long-term
hardening  of  budget  constraints.  Until  prices  are  rational,  profits  and
losses  are  not  necessarily  good  indicators  of efficiency,  and  are therefore
not a good  guide  to decisions  on  which  firms  should  be closed  and  which should
obtain  financing  for  increased  investment.  Closing  a firm  whose  output  price
is  held  below  its  social  value  is not  necessarily  an optimal  response  to its
financial  losses. Firms  cannot  easily  be held  accountable  for  their
profitability  if government  sets  their  prices.
Because  of  past  patterns  of industrial  organization,  additional  measures
may  be required  to develop  competitive  markets. These  are likely  to include
active  and  early  demonopolization  of transport,  distribution  and trade
systems. They  may involve  the  breakup  of large  conglomerates  formed,  not in
response  to  market  imperatives,  but  to reduce  problems  of control  and  to
secure  inputs  in the  shortage  socialist  system. Though  demonopolization  is22
needed,  it should  be approached  with an international  perspective,  especially
for  a small  country. As a  method  of enhancing  competition,  the  opening  up of
trade  is likely  to be preferable  to fragmenting  firms  to achieve  competition
on the  domestic  market.
So far,  only  product  prices  and  markets  have  been  considered,  but  the
creation  of factor  markets  and  liberalization  of factor  prices  are also
important. They are  discussed  later.
Enterprise reform.  Enterprise reform --  in all sectors, not only industry --
is the  heart  of the  transformation  process. As in all  areas,  the  process
requires  interrelated  changes:  the  imposition  of  bottom  line  discipline,
definition  and  change  of ownership,  and  reform  of  management  arrangements.
The  ownership  issue  is a political  mine field:  workers  in  worker-managed  firms
believe  they  have  substantial  claims  on the  firms;  insider  salee  of firms  by
and  to former  managers  and  bureaucrats  (spontaneous  privatizations)  create
inequities.  How  to respond  to such  sales,  which  are  likely  to be the  first
reactions  to liberalized  regulations,  is  an important  policy  question  for  the
government.  Political  reaction  against  initial  bursts  of spontaneous
privatization  in  Hungary  and  Poland  resulted  in  their  suspension,  and  a lull
in  privatization  activity  in  these  countries. Sales  of firms  before  their
value  can  be determined  in  a realistic  price  system  are likely  to be
inequitable  ex  post;  and  nationalist  sentiment  in  all  countries  will put  some
limits  on the  role  of foreign  ownership. 31 The  ownership  of agricultural  land
31/  China's  rural  reform,  in  which  communes  were  in  effect  privatized  to  their
members,  stands  as the  most impressive  example  of property  rights  reform
among  socialist countries.  The  introduction of  the  household
responsibility  system  has  been  shown  by  Lin  (1986)  to  have  been  responsible
for  most  of  the  increase  in  agricultural  output  associated  with  the  Chinese23
poses  another  set  of politically-charged  issues.
Corporatization  --  a change  in the  status  of a firm,  to render  it a
joint-stock  or other  form  of corporation  --  is  normally  the first  stage,  but
restructuring  and  privatization  are  the  two  real  phases  of enterprise  reform.
Opinions  on  which should  come  first  differ.
a) Slow  privatizers  argue  that firms  should  be sold  off  gradually  after
restructuring,  in a  more  rational  price  system,  after  the  new rules  of
economic  behavior  begin  to emerge,  and  after  a real  business  class  has  had
time  to develop  to exercise  the  ownership  function. The  prices  of firms  will
be  more realistic,  and  the  sales  process  more equitable,  both  because  the  new
owners  will pay  the  right  prices,  and  because  the  government  will obtain  more
revenue. Slow  privatizers  point,  for  example,  to the  privatization  process  in
Britain,  and  cite  the  need for  "re  .1  owners",  private  agents  with a long-term
view  and  sufficient  equity  in a given  firm  to encourage  an active  role  and
give a strong  measure  of control.  They suggest also that Dremature
Drivatization  may unnecessarily  create  interest  groups  of shareholders  who
object  to the  removal  of distortions,  such  as subsidies,  which  impact
adversely  on the  value  of their  assets.
b) Fast  Drivatizers  argue  that  more comprehensive  and  rapid  ownership  reform
is  necessary  to increase  efficiency. 32 A further  argument  is  political.
reforms. Such reforms  are  probably  far  more difficult  in an industrial
setting,  and in  a less  authoritarian  system.
32/  Discussion  of the Hungarian  reform process provides  examples of the
distinction  between  slow  and fast  privatizers,  with Kornai (1990)  as a
slow  privatizer,  and  the  Blue  Ribbon  Commission  (1990)  arguing  for fast
privatization.  The period that has been suggested appropriate  for
privatization  of a  major  part  of industry  ranges  from  less  than  three  to
around  thirty  years  in  various  studies.24
Without  the  power  of a substantial  capitalist  class  behind  it  --  and  it is
agreed  that  such  a class  will  not emerge  rapidly,  the  reform  process  will
surely  be subverted  and  prematurely  terminiated  by the  interest  groups
representing  adversely  affected  segments  of society,  such  as potentially  laid-
off  workers  and  redundant  bureaucrats.  Reform  must  be radical  and fast-
moving,  to deny  such  groups  the  opportunity  to coalesce. It is  widely
accepted  that  more rapid  privatization  reduces  the  expected  total  sales
revenue  to the  state;  fast  privatizers  argue  that  the  benefits  of a rapid  and
irreversible  shift  to  private  production  outweigh  the  costs  of  reduced  state
revenue,  and  that  higher  tax  revenues  from  a  more efficient  economy  offset  the
loss  of revenue  from  rapid  privatization.
A number  of schemes  has  been  proposed  to achieve  the  goal  of rapid
privatization  in an equitable  and  politically  acceptable  fashion,  and  in doing
so to overcome  the  problem  posed  by uncertain  asset  valuation. The schemes
typically  involve  creating  shares  in  existing  compinies,  and  distributing  them
on a broad  basis  within  the  country. Most proposals  recognize  that  very
dispersed  ownership  does  not  provide  a basis  for  effective  control,  and
therefore  include  a  mechanism  to create  a dominant  shareholder  or group  of
shareholders  to  monitor  the  management  of individual  companies. Some offer
employees  preferential  access  to  a block  of shares,  as an  efficiency
incentive,  and  to render  the  process  acceptable  to them. Consider  two
approaches:
i)  Create  holding  companies  or unit  trusts  to  be dominant  shareholders,
sufficient  in number  to ensure  competition  among  them. The state  can  retain  a
bloc  of shares  for  later  sale  or  distribution  to citizens,  thereby  ensuring25
that  the  benefits  of  privatization  are  shared  by  the  public.  It  can  also
offer  citizens  shares  in  the  holding  companies,  so  offering  them  diversified
portfolios.  The  difficulty  here  is  to  eu.sure  that  the  dominant  shareholders
operate  like  private  owners,  when  they  are  not  (unless  of  course,  they  consist
of  foreign  owners  who  have  sufficient  wealth  to  buy  the  shares).  There  is
also  the  risk  that  privatization  may  stall  at some  intermediate  stage.
ii)  Distribute  shares  of  each  enterprise  equally  across  the  population  and
initiate  trading  arrangements  to  enable  dominant  ownership  groups  to  emerge.
Whether  an  effective  ownership  group  would  actually  result  from  such  a
process,  and  whether  the  large  ex  post  inequities  that  are  likely  to  arise  are
acceptable  because  of  ex  ante  fairness,  are  important  questions.33
No country  has  yet  implemented  schemes  of  these  types,  but  they  are
being  actively  discussed  and  implementing  legislation  passed  in  Czechoslovakia
and  Poland. 3 4
A variety  of  approaches  is  likely  to  be  adopted  in  practice.  Consider
first  firms  in  potentially  competitive  sectors,  and  suppose  that  price  reform
and  macrostabilization  have  progressed  sufficiently  to  make  reasonable
viability  judgments  possible."  Small  weak  firms  should  be  closed  and  their
33/  Of  course,  without  an  adequate  information  base,  no  stock  market
established  at  an  early  stage  of  reform  would  offer  a  useful  basis  for
valuation  or  any  indication  of  desirable  investment  patterns.  The purpose
of  the  initial  exchanges  is,  however,  quite  different.
34/  See  Lipton  and  Sachs  (1990)  for  the  presentation  of  a  rapid  privatization
scheme,  involving  the  distribution  of  shares,  for  Poland.
35/  In  the  early  stages  of  reform,  many  potentially  viable  firms  are  likely
to  experience  severe  liquidity  --  and  possibly  solvency  --  difficulties,
due  to  exceptionally  depressed  markets,  disruption  of  CMEA  trade,  and
exceptional  interest  charges.  These  short-run  difficulties  greatly26
assets  and  premises  sold  off;  small  stronger  firms  could  be privatized
rapidly,  possibly  being  sold  to all  or some  of the  existing  employees,  with
the  state  offering  some  seller  finance. The  state  will have to  handle  the
large  weak firms,  with extensive  restructuring  needed  to  move them  into  the
private  sector  if they  are  not closed. 3"  The larger  firms  with potential  are
the  crux  of the  privatization  problem. Many  could  be privatized,  at least  in
part,  relatively  rapidly. Foreign  investors  are  already  active  in each
country. In some  cases  they  could  either  take  on the  role  of dominant
shareholder  (possibly  on a temporary  basis)  or could  manage  the firm  on
contract  for  a domestic  holding  company. Shares  in  such  firms  could  be
distributed  under  the schemes  discussed  above.
Whatever  the  precise  rapid  method  used,  it is likely  that state  holding
companies  will  play  an important  ownership  role  in the  transition. Given  the
scarcity  of domestic  owners  and  the  undesirability  of a fire  sale  to
foreigners,  there  seems  to  be no alternative.  Some  form  of holding  company
structure  would  likely  also  be needed  under  the  slow  privatization  option,  as
a  vehicle  for  the  state  to assert  its  ownership  through  the  stage  of
restructuring.  In the  longer  run,  holding  companies  may  be privatized;
alternatively  they  could  be converted  into  pension  funds  by transferring  to
them  the  appropriate  liabilities. Foreign  management  may be a useful
intermediate  stage;  so  might  foreign  ownership  although  there  are  political
limits  to this  and  it  is anyway  inappropriate  to sell  national  assets  off  too
complicate  the  task  of  deciding  whether  to  close  down  or support  any  given
firm.
36/  It seems  doubtful  that the  private  sector  could  handle  restructuring  of
very large,  weak industries  because  of the  potential  political  reaction.27
cheaply  out  of  very short-term  considerations.
In line  with  European  tradition,  and  considering  the  regulatory
difficulties,  natural  monopolies  should  probably  not  be privatized  early,
unless  perhaps  this  is particularly  needed  to attract  large  foreign
investments  to facilitate  restructuring  and  modernization.
Financial  markets. The  development  of financial  markets  and  private  sector
financial  institutions,  including  banks,  is  an essential  step  in the
transition  to a  market  economy,  and  in  moving  investment  decisions  away  from
government  control. Indeed,  many reforming  socialist  countries  have  taken
steps  in this  direction,  including  moving  from  a  monobank  to a two-tier
banking  system;  several  of the  ESEs are  also  discussing  the  rapid  creation  of
a stock  market. But tnere  are  important  differences  between  enterprise  reform
and  the  reform  of financial  institutions,  which  imply  different  treatment  in
the  overall  system  reform.
More so than  other  sectors,  financial  markets  depend  on  underlying  legal
and  informational  systems  and  skills  that  barely  exist  in  ESEs.  Further,  the
problems  of existing  loan  portfolios,  which  are  very substantial  in the
reforming  ESEs,  have to  be addressed  before  a sound  banking  system  can  emerge.
Existing  loan  losses,  which originated  when the  central  bank's  portfolio  was
allocated  to the  commercial  banks,  will  have to  be moved  off  balance-sheet  and
allocated,  either  to depositors  or other  lenders,  or absorbed  by the  budget.
In addition,  large  loan  losses  that  will appear  as relative  prices  and  demand
patterns  shift  in the  course  of domestic  and  trade  reform  will need  to be
handled  in a similar  way.  The  banks  should  be recapitalized  and  expected  to
function  as market  institutions  only  after  the  economy  has  settled  down28
sufficiently  to enable  loan  portfolios  to  be kept reasonably  clean. And
before  then,  the  proliferation  of banking  institutions  shiould  be constrained,
and  emphasis  on competition  in financial  markets  be  moderated,  although  some
entry  of foreign  banks,  as  participants  or  managers  of domestic  institutions,
can  play  an important  role.
The  differences  between  banking  reform  and  enterprise  reform  occur
because  the  condition  of the  firms  determines  the  state  of the  banks'
portfolios,  their  earning  potential  and  their  equity  (assets  corrected  for
expected  loan  losses  lzss  liabilities).  If  their  equity  is zero  or negative  -
- as is  the  case in several  and  possibly  all  ESEs,  banks  face  pex'verse
incentive.  in  mobilizing  and  allocating  credit;  these  incentives  lead  to
viable  borrowers  being  crowded  out.  If  banks'  budget  constraint  is  hardened
without  restructuring  portfolios,  they  will  attempt  to compensate  for  a  high
share  of nonperforming  loans  by raising  charges  to paying  clients.37  The
latter  will face  extremely  high  costs  of credit  because  of large  banking
spreads. Under  such  conditions  it  is likely  that  it is  mainly  firms  in
potential  financial  trouble  that  will borrow  from  banks.
A truly  competitive  banking  system  therefore  cannot  be expected  to
emerge  before  the  processes  of enterprise  restructuring  and  price  reform  are
substantially  under  way.  This  raises  several  sequencing  issues,  which are
addressed  below,  including  the  question  of  how  new firms  are  to  be financed
early  in the  transition  process. Other  important  questions  to  be considered
are  the  ownership  of banks  (they  should  not  be owned  by client  firms)  and
whether  banks  should  have an  ownership  role  as in  Germany  and  Japan.  The
37/  This process  is apparently  taking  place  at  present  in  Yugoslavia.29
last  point  is less  important  at the  start  of reform,  because  the  banks  have  no
obvious  capability  to exert  a positive  ownership  role.
IV.  The Seauencing  of  Reforms
Administrative  feasibility  alone  ensures  that  not  all  reforms  can  be
instituted  simultaneously.  The  more fundamental  reason  for  sequencing  reforms
is  that some  changes  are  preconditions  for  others:  for  instance,  macroeconomic
stabilization  is  needed  if  price  reform  is to  be successful. It is  necessary
to develop  systems  and  skills  ths  have  to be in  place  for  markets  to  work.
To take  an important  example,  financial  liberalization  is  extremely  risky
unless  a sound  system  of accounting,  auditing,  prudential  regulation  and
supervision  is in  place,  and  unless  the  macroeconomy  is reasonably  stable.
The sequencing  problem  has been  extensively  studied  in  the  analysis  of
the  structural  adjustment  of developing  economies. While some  rules  of thumb
emerged  in that  context, 38 the  more important  conclusion  is that  a linear
sequer.ce  of individual  policy  changes  is not  the  right  concept. The  problem
is better  thought  of as one  of the  Dackaging  of reforms:  ths  need is to
introduce  groups  of complementary  policy  reforms,  sequentially.
The  details  of  the  reform  path  to  be followed  by a country  depend  on the
state  of  the economy,  on the  tolerance  of the  population  for  the  disruptions
that  are  sure  to accompany  the  reform  process,  and  on the  political  situation
in each  country. Nonetheless  in  Figure  2  we outline  a  prototype  reform
38/  For  example,  that  when  inflation  is  rapid,  macroeconomic  stabilization  is
needed  before  reforms  that  change  relative  prices  --  such  as  trade  reforms
--  are  undertaken,  that  goods  markets  should  not  be  liberalized  later  than
factor  markets,  and that  the  capital  account  should  generally  be opened
after  the  trade  account.30
process  for  a representative  ESE country,  with initial  conditions  somewhere
between  those  of  Poland  and  Czechoslovakia.
For countries  with high  inflation  and  non-sustainable  balance  of
payments  deficits,  macroeconomic  stabilization  has t  be the  initial
priority. The severity  of the  program  and  the  range  of  accompanying
structural  reform  measures  will reflect  the  extent  of initial  imbalances  and
political  judgments  about  what is acceptable  to the  population.  A new
government,  or a government  with support  for  radical  change,  has far  more
leeway,  and  should  use  it,  for  it is  harder  to impose  tough  measures  later.
For  an extreme  case,  such  as Poland,  stabilization  in a  way consistent
with a  move towards  a  market  system  included  sharp  cuts in firm-specific
subsidies  and  tight  credit  limits. It also  included  trade  liberalization  on a
major  scale,  and  at a  heavily  depreciated  exchange  rate.  In high inflation
countries,  it  may  be necessary  in  the  initial  phase  of stabilization  to fix
the  nominal  exchange  rate  to  provide  a  nominal  anchor  for  the  price  level. It
is also  necessary  to create  an emergency  safety  net  that  shifts  social
protection  off  the  shoulders  of firms,  thereby  facilitating  resource
reallocation  --  which  in the  case  of  labor  means  unemployment.
While initial  success  in reducing  inflation  from  very high  levels  can  be
achieved  within  a few  months,  stabilization  can  be assured  only  by following
consistent  policies  over  periods  of  years. During  that  time,  measures  to
allow  indirect  macroeconomic  control  should  be put  in place. It  may take
years  for  the  expectation  of  macroeconomic  stability  to  become  sufficiently
ingrained  to affect  long-term  economic  decision-making.  A particularly
difficult  stage  for  reforming  governments  comes  a few  months  after  the  success31
of the  initial  phase,  when unemployment  is rising,  firms  are  beginning  to
experience  financial  difficulties  and  closings  are  in sight. Inflation  is
lower,  and  the  demands  for  reflation  --  meaning  an easing  of credit
constraints  and  reinstatement  of some  subsidies  --  are  pressing. For  this
reason  alone,  governments  have to  move quickly  after  stabilization  to
formulate  measures  for  the  emergency  restructuring  of firms.
Price  reform  for  goods  is shown  as taking  place  early  as a prerequisite
for  decentralization  and tightening  budget  constraints,  with trade  reform  an
important  element. Progressive  reductions  in state  interventions  continue  the
process.
Wage determination  presents  a  major  challenge. In socially  owned  firms
(the  great  majority)  wage-setting  cannot  be left  to the  market  early  in the
process,  because  the  firms  are  not operating  under  correct  price  and
management  signals. At the  same  time,  wages  must respond  to inflation  and
changing  relative  prices,  including  those  (such  as the  introduction  of  more
realistic  rents)  needed  to place  the  housing  sector  on a sound  basis. Wage
guidelines  or formulae  have  to be used  initially  in  non-privately  owned
firms; 39 wage determination  can  increasingly  be left  to the  market  as firms
are  restructured  and  privatized.
Realistic  interest  rates  are  needed  to attract  depositors  into  the
banking  system  and  to  provide  a reasonable  measure  of the  cost  of financial
resources  to firms. But  it  will not  be possible  to leave  interest  rate
determination  to the  market  until  far  into  the  reform,  because  the  appropriate
incentive  structures  for  firms  and  banks  will not  be in  place. Premature
39/  In the  case  of Poland,  wages  were  Partiallv  indexed.32
reliance  on the  financial  market  as an instrument  of indirect  economic
management  is likely  to raise  real interest  rates  to the  point  where  they
create  financial  difficulties  even  for  firms  that  would  be sound  in normal
times,  and  to  provoke  costly  financial  crises.
Measures  to eliminate  regulatory  discrimination  against  the  private
sector  can  be taken  at the  start  of the  process.4 0 Privatization  of small
firms  can  also  start  immediately,  with small-scale  commercial  bank lending
needed  in support. Whether  or  not some  holding  company  mechanism  is used  as
an intermediate  stage  or some  shares  are  distributed  across  the  population,
preparation  for  the  restructuring  and  "real"  privatization  of  most larger
firms  is likely  to take  several  years,  and  the  execution  to take  much longer.
Preparation,  including  corporatization,  has  nonetheless  to begin  as soon  as
possible. Clarification  of ownership  rights,  and  the  movement  of
responsibility  for  the  direction  of firms  to  Boards  of Directors,  should  be
implemented  as rapidly  as  possible.
Banking  system  reforms  involve  several  stages. Preparation  can  begin
immediately,  with the  establisbment  of suitable  accounting  and  asset  valuation
standards,  reform  of banking,  contract,  enterprise  and  bankruptcy  laws  and  the
drafting  of prudential  regulations,  as  well as staff  training. Next  come
audits  of firms  and  banks  and  asset  valuations,  followed  by portfolio
restructuring  (the  counterpart  to enterprise  restructuring),  allocation  of
losses,  and  recapitalization.  OnLly after  this  process  is complete  can  a
40/  Hungary,  Poland,  Czechoslovakia  and  Yugoslavia  have all taken steps  to
place  private  firms  onto  the  same  legal  and  regulatory  footing  as public
firms.33
market-based  banking  system  emerge."
From  a purely  technical  perspective,  equity  markets  can  probably  be
created  quite  near  the start  of the  reform  process. But,  apart  from  their
possible  initial  role  in consolidating  claims  noted  above,  they  will only  be a
facade  because  valuation  and  information  deficiencies  will  prevent  them  from
playing  a  useful  role  in the  allocation  of resources." Evolving  such  a role
will take  years  and  they  should  not  be developed  on any  significant  scale
until  the  banking  system  has  been restructured.
The  need for  financial  sector  reform  not  to outrun  enterprise  reform
raises  the important  question  of how  the  emerging  private  sector  is to obtain
financial  services  in  the interim. One  possibility  is to  establish
specialized  financial  institutions  for  the  private  sector. A better  solution,
given  the  need for  the  banks  to acquire  the  capabilities  needed  to serve
private  clients,  is to implement  a two-track  strategy  for  the  banking  system,
with  private  sector  service  departments  in  all  major  banks,  initially  on a
small  scale,  and  the  separation  of  assets  in  private  and  publicly  owned
entities.
We do  not show  a separate  line  for  international  trade  in Figure  2.
That is  because  reform  of goods  trade  is  treated  as an element  of price
reform. Current  account  convertibility,  which  means  essentially  unrestricted
41/  This  is  not  to  say  that  the  banks  cannot  at all  be active  participants  in
the  restructuring  process. Indeed  centers  of expertise  can  be usefully
developed  in the banks, but responsibility  for the process and its
financing  must lie  outside  the  banking  system.
42/  In  China,  for  example,  equity  issues  can  be found  despite  the  absence  of
laws  defining  private  property  rights. Liabilities  combining  features  of
debt  and  preferred  shares  are  also issued,  but  without  clear  definition
of  holders'  rights  and  the  basis  for  their  returns.34
access  to foreign  exchange  for  current  account  transactions,  is  desirable  as
an early  part  of the  reform  program.' It is particularly  important  to  make
provisions  for  the  treatment  of foreign  investors  early  in the  process.
Capital  account  convertibility  should  come  later,  when expectations  of
stability  have  been  established.
This simple  treatment  of trade  and  payments  issues  ignores,  however,  the
need  for  reserves  to  be adeq%-ate  prior  to liberalizing  the  current  account.
Poland's  reserves  had  been augmented  by standby  agreements,  and  Poland  enjoyed
a de facto  moratorium  on debt  service;  Yugoslavia  had accumulated  reserves
prior  to initiating  its  major  reforms. Countries  in the  position  of Bulgaria,
with essentially  no reserves,  face  greater  risks  in opening  their  current
accounts. Also ignored  are  complications  arising  from  the  changing  CMEA
regime. In addition  to the  product  quality  issue  discussed  above,  CNEA  reform
is  likely  to exacerbate  the  reserve  problem  by raising  the  share  of trade  for
which  normal  reserve  cover  is needed.
Figure  2 shows  how  much  has to  be done  at the  beginning. Virtually  all
the  reforms,  or  at least  their  planning,  have to start  quickly,  even  though
implementation  may take  a decade. Of course,  Figure  2 exaggerates  the
precision  of the  process,  and  it  certainly  does  not show  the  setbacks  that  are
inevitable  in any  economic  reform  program.
Figure  2 also  cannot  show  one  other  vital  element. A government  that
starts  out  with a clear  idea  of  what it  wants  to achieve  and  with a  popular
43/  Some  countries  may  elect  to  use  dual  exchange  rates  and  important  licensing
for  some  transitional  period. In these  cases,  it  would  be important  for
firms  to  have  access  to foreign  exchange  and  automatic  import  licenses  in
the  free  foreign  exchange  market.35
mandate  to  move in that  direction,  and  that  resolutely  pursues  its  goals,  vill
transform  the  economy  more successfully  than  a government  and  a society  which
is not  sure  of  what it  wants. For this  reason,  reform  is  more likely  to
succeed  in those  countries  where  there  is  a consensus  on the  necessity  of
moving  to a normal  private  market  economy.
V.  The  Role of Foreigners
The  success  of economic  reform  in  ESEs  depends  heavily  on the  extent  to
which  the  reforming  governments  open  their  economies  to foreign  trade,
capital,  and  expertise,  and  the  response  of  Western  economies  and
governments. Opening  to foreign  trade  immediately  puts in place  the  right
price  signals,  allows  countries  to  benefit  from  larger  markets,  and  from
foreign  technologies.  The  proximity  of  Western  Europe  makes  these  benefits
obvious  to the  reforming  governments,  and  to those  contemplating  raforms.
The  reforming  governments  have  welcomed  foreign  direct  investment,
though  it is not  yet taking  place  on a large  scale  except  in the  former  East
Germany. It  will be  necessary  for  ESE  governments  to develop  a systematic
approach  to foreign  investment  and  foreign  ownership,  recognizing  that  the
right  approach  is  not to create  special  incentives  for  foreign  investors,  but
rather  to create  conditions  favorable  to both  domestic  and  foreign  private
investment.
Official  foreign  finance  is also  needed  to ensure  reserves,  cushion  the
short-run  impact  of stabilization,  and  to  help develop  infrastructure.
Bilateral  support  ex:cept  for  East  Germany  has  been limited  so far,  but  the
multilaterals  have started  lending  on a large  scale. The  potential  role  of36
the  new  EBRD as a lender  to the  private  sector  is important,  especially  given
the  reluctance  of commercial  banks  to become  involved,  but it  will take  some
time  to  work out  how  public  money  should  be channelled  to the  private  sector.
Foreign  expertise,  from  both the  private  and  official  sectors,  is avidly
solicited  by ESE  countries. It is  essential  to expand  the  use  of  management
contracts  and  other  methods  of  using  experts  with the  down-to-earth  knowledge
of how  to run  businesses  and  the  other  institutions  that  support  a  market
economy.
What should  Western  goverruments  do  to help  the  reform  process? They
cannot  intervene  directly  in the  intense  political  ferment  that  in the  end
will determine  many  aspects  of the  reform  process,  but  they can  make four
important  contributions:
e  Market  access: With generally  restrictive  domestic  spending
policies  and  the  need  to upgrade  to  Western  standards,  access  to
the  markets  of industrial  countries  is  vital  for  a rapid  return  to
growth. It is  extremely  important  that  the  industrialized
countries  open  their  markets  to exports  from  the  ESEs.
Technical  assistance: The  needs  of  the reforming  countries  are
enorious. Because  of their  relatively  high levels  of literacy  and
numeracy,  the  payoff  to a period  of intensive  and  well-coordinated
technical  assistance,  will be high. Direct,  firm-level,  assistance  can
be especially  useful.
Financial  assistance:  Some  countries,  especially  Poland,  embark  on
reform  with crushing  debt  burdens. Relief  is  an essential  ingredient  of
reform,  as is continued  access  to capital  to finance  restructuring  and37
provide  a cushion  during  the  transformation  process. Assistance  aimed
directly  at cushioning  the  impact  of restructuring  can  also  play an
important  part.
Coordination:  Present  aid  efforts  are  so ill  coordinated  that  they
stretch  the  already  overstretched  implementation  capacities  of the
reforming  governments.  Coordination  has to  be improved.
VI.  Conclusion
This  paper  has attempted  to  define  the  main components  of system  reform
programs  aimed  at transforming  a socialist  economy  into  a  private  market
economy. Initial  conditions  that  shape  reform  have  been discussed,  together
with the  complementarities  between  major  elements  of reform  and  the  need for
certain  reforms  to precede  others  for  a program  to be consistent.  The  paper
then  sketched  out  an illustrative  schedule  for  such  a program  for  a
representative  country.
In practice,  any  given  country  will face  many choices  concerning  its
reform  path.  Some  of these  will involve  differences  in  the  target  of reform,
the  ultimate  form  of the  private  market  economy. In general  terms,  the
organization  of such  economies  is quite  well-defined,  but  there  are  important
differences  across  industrial  countries. In some,  the state  plays  a  more
active  economic  role  than  in  others,  social  insurance  coverage  and  collective
bargaining  methods  differ  widely,  and  so on.  Economic  theory  offers
relatively  little  guidance  for  making  decisions  on the  distribution  of  wealth
across  the  population. There  are  also  important  choices  to  be  made concerning
the  role  of foreign  ownership  and  control. Such  differences  obviously  will38
affect  the  design  of specific  programs,
Even  with consensus  on the  elements  of  reform,  implementation  can
generate  substantial  debate. For  example,  the  approach  towards  regulating
natural  monopolies  differs  as between  the  US and  Europe,  tax codes  and  banking
regulation  and  supervision  are  not  uniform. In some  of these  areas,  flaws  are
apparent  in  certain  potential  models  which  have evolved  over  time.44  But  more
often  the  most important  consideration  in shaping  reform  may be to ensure
consistency  with potential  trading  partners  and  sources  of capital,  so that
differential  regulation  does  not impede  economic  integration.
The  important  strategic  choices,  however,  arise  out  of the interplav
between  economics  and  politics. System  reform  is an intensely  political
process,  and  the imperatives  of  political  sustainability  may dominate  the
analysis  of the  reform  process:  indeed,  the  major  differences  between
alternative  proposals  for  reform  reflect,  to a large  extent,  different
strategic  views  of  what  will be sustainable.  The  time  needed  to reform
institutions,  create  skills  -- including  the  re-instatement  of a business  class
--  and  establish  valuations  argues  for  a  measured  pace  of reform. But such  a
slow  process  has  costs,  including  prolonged  uncertainty  and  perhaps  an
extended  period  of  poor  asset  management. It runs  the  risk  that  opposition  to
the  changes  will coalesce  to terminate  the  process. This  leads  to the  rapid
approach,  wherein  markets  are  apt  to  be liberalized  prior  to adequate
preparatory  steps  and  owners  to  be created  early,  either  in the  form  of
various  holding  arrangements  or spontaneously  by trading  claims. The rapid
44/  For example,  few  would  now  recommend  adopting  the  organization  of the  US
banking  industry  or the  institutional  fragmentation  of its  regulators.39
approach  to reform  has  definite  merits,  especially  if reserves  have  been built
up to tide  the  country  over  the  period  of economic  disruption  that  is likely
to follow. However,  it too  runs  high  risks,  because  of the  potential  for
chaos.
Especially  in this  situation,  technocratic  solutions  are  not  sufficient.
In addition  to tryi.ng  to  define  optimal,  or even  feasible,  transition
strategies,  economists  must have  an eye  for  the  major  inconsistencies,  risks
and  dead-ends  likely  to result  from  strategies  driven  by political  processes,
and  must seek  ways to defuse  such  problems,  if possible  before  they  become
aerious  enough  to  undermine  reform. At the same  time,  politicians  have  to
recognize  that  the  present  crises  have  been created  by the  neglect  of economic
factors,  and  that  political  considerations  alone  cannot  drive  the  reform
process._ 40 -
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Table  1:
BASIC  DATA  ON  EAST  EUROPEAN  ECONOMIES
Alb-  Bulg- Czech.  East Hungary  Poland Romania USSR  Yugo.  USA  West
ania  aria  Ger.  Ger.
Population  3  9  16  17  11  38  23  283  23  244  61
(millions)
Area  29  111  128  108  93  313  238  22402 256  9373  249
(,000  sq.  km)
GNP  (CIA)  $bn.1  - 68  158  207  92  276  126  2535  154  4881  1206
1988  Z  of  U.S.  - 38  51  63  44  37  28  52  33  - -
per  capita
Exchange  Rate  - 13  18  35  13  9  16  19  11  100  -
Estimates
Z of  U.S. 2
per  capita
GDP  Physical  - 30  42  45  32  27  21  na  22  100  -
Indicators
1988  Z  of  U.S. 3
per  capita
Bal.  of  Payments  - -1.1  -0.1  0.7  -0.7  -1.3  2.1  0.1  1.5  -115  60
($bn.),  1989
Hard  Currency  - 5.5  4.0  10.0 15.4  35.6  0.8  30.5  17.7  - -
Debt  ($bn.)
Life  Expectancy  72  72  71  73  70  71  70  69  71  75  75
at  Birth
Infant  39  15  13  9  21  24  na  25  24  14  15
Mortality  Rate
I  CIA,  Handbook  of  Economic  Statistics,  1989.
2  Tentative  estimates,  using  IFS  data  where  available  and  staff  estimates  in  other  cases.
I  Eva  Erlich,  "Absolute  and  Relative  Economic  Development  Levels  and  Their  Structure  1937-
1980",  Budapest,  1987,  mimeograph,  P.  15.
Other  sources: World  Bank,  World  Development  Indicators,  World  Tables;  WEFA,  World  Economic
Outlook,  October  1989;  G.  Pink  and  P.  Havlik,  "Alternative  Measures  of  Growth  and  Development
Levels: Comparisons  and  Assessments",  in  Joint  Economic  Committee,  Pressures  for  Reform  in  the
East  European  Economies,  October  1989.
na:  not  available45
Table  2:
ECONOMIC  ELEMENTS  OF SYSTEM  REFORM
1.  Macroeconomic  stabilization  and  control
Implementation  of stabilization  programs
Creation of tools and  institutions  for indirect  macroeconomic
control,  monetary  and fiscal
Measures  to  harden  budget  constraints
Dealing  with  existing  problems  (monetary  overhang,  financial  system
bankruptcies)
la.  Social  Safety  Nets (at  first  on  an emergency  basis)
2.  Institutional  Reforms: Human  Capital  and  Administrative  Capacity
Legal  and  regulatory  institutions
Business  management,  including  financial  sector
Government  decision-makers  and  administrators
Information  systems  (accounting  and  auditing)
3.  Price  and  Market  Reform
Domestic  price  reform
International  trade  liberalization
Distribution  systems  for  products
Creation  of  market  for  housing
Wages
Interest  Rates
4.  Small  and  Large  Scale  Enterprise  Restructuring  and  Privatization
Management  systems




Social  protection  and  insurance  rights  for  individuals
5.  Development  of Financial  Markets  and  Institutions
Banking  systems
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